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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EFFECTIVE
LEGAL ACTION
JUDGE EDWARD D. RE*
Our area of concern, the role of the courts and the enforce-
ment of human rights, causes us to think of the splendid address
delivered by Roscoe Pound in 1916 before the Pennsylvania Bar
Association. In an address entitled The Limits of Effective Legal
Action,' delivered by Dean Pound the year that he commenced his
illustrious career as Dean of the Harvard Law School, Dean
Pound summarized the various stages of law. He commenced
with "primitive law," which is followed by a second stage of legal
development which may be called "strict law." This period is fol-
lowed by a third stage of development when an attempt is made to
* Chief Judge Emeritus of the United States Court of International Trade and
Distinguished Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. Judge Re was
Chairman of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States and
Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. He served as Chair
for the American Bar Association's Section of International and Comparative Law, as
President of the American Society of Comparative Law and is a Member Emeritus of
the Board of Higher Education of the City of New York. Having served in World War
II and during the Korean conflict, Judge Re is a Colonel in the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Department of the United States Air Force (Retired).
1 Roscoe Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, Address Before the Penn-
sylvania Bar Association (June 27, 1916), in 3 A.B.A. J. 55, and in THE LAWYER's
TRAsuRY 223 (Eugene C. Gerhart ed. 1956).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
identify the legal order with the moral order. In this third period
of development, the individual human being, as the crucial moral
unit, also becomes the legal unit. Gradually, but finally, a period
is reached which tests the limits of effective legal action when,
once again, the legal system enters upon the stage influenced by
morals. Gradually, the attempt or effort is made to have the law
coincide with morals. At this stage, the effort or attempt is to en-
force ethical standards, and to transform moral norms into legal
duties.
This fourth period of legal development approaches the ma-
turity of law when the moral worth of the individual claims full
legal recognition. In the words of Pound, this occurs when the law
seeks "ambitiously to cover the whole field of social control."'
Pound, of course, also reminded us that laws are not self-en-
forcing, and that "[h]uman beings must execute them, and there
must be some motive setting the individual in motion to do this
above and beyond the abstract content of the rule and its conform-
ity to an ideal justice or an ideal of social interest."3 At this junc-
ture in his presentation, Pound referred to a social reformer who
declared that "the real function of law is to register the protest of
society against wrong." 4
Dean Pound's response is worthy of quotation:
Well, protests of society against wrong are no mean thing. But
one may feel that a prophet rather than a law-maker is the
proper mouthpiece for the purpose. It is said that Hunt, the agi-
tator, appeared on one occasion before Lord Ellenborough at cir-
cuit, a propos of nothing upon the calendar, to make one of his
harangues. After the Chief Justice had explained to him that he
was not in a tribunal of general jurisdiction to inquire into every
species of wrong throughout the kingdom, but only in a court of
assize ... Hunt exclaimed, "But, my Lord, I desire to protest."
"Oh, certainly," said Lord Ellenborough. "By all means. Usher!
Take Mr. Hunt into the corridor and allow him to protest as
much as he pleases." Our statute books are full of protests of
society against wrong which are efficacious for practical purposes
as the declamations of Mr. Hunt in the corridor of Lord Ellenbor-
ough's court.5
2 3 A B.A. J. at 65.
3 Id. at 69.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 69-70.
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For us, Dean Pound's reference to the remarks of Lord Ellen-
borough, that Mr. Hunt could protest in the corridor, reminds us
that the courts can neither decide cases nor right wrongs unless
they have jurisdiction to hear a case properly presented for adju-
dication. Jurisdiction is the key word for courts. It implies the
legal right by which judges exercise their authority. Jurisdiction
is required to give the authority and power to adjudicate. Without
it a court is powerless to hear a case and to give a remedy. Our
topic, therefore, promises to be more than a discussion of ideals
and ethical norms. We meet to discuss a practical aspect of
human rights and fundamental freedoms. We will be discussing
the role of the courts, and the extent to which the courts may give
legal effect to those moral norms embraced within the words
"human rights and fundamental freedoms."
Oliver Wendell Holmes has reminded us that the law is a call-
ing of thinkers. It is worthy of note that it is a calling, a vocation,
a ministry. Lawyers, however, are not only thinkers, they also
must be doers. Our speakers, and all of us, will not merely be
discussing ideals and lofty goals. We also will learn how, and to
what extent, we may give legal effect to ideals and moral norms.
It was for this purpose that I quoted from Pound's notable ad-
dress, The Limits of Effective Legal Action.6 Since we know that
there are limits, we are here to explore those limits. What are the
effective limits of human rights before the domestic courts? To
what extent can the domestic courts be utilized to give a remedy
in those cases in which people have suffered human rights viola-
tions, and wish effective redress or remedy? All of us, therefore,
whether as lawyers, judges, teachers, or lawmakers, must do what
is necessary to see to it that courts are granted jurisdiction to hear
cases when legal wrongs need to be righted, and when human
rights need to be vindicated. Having jurisdiction over cases, the
power to decide, courts may then proceed to the merits of the cases
regardless of the passions and emotions of the moment. So, I con-
clude my introductory remarks by urging that we continue to
work to further the progress that has been made in achieving
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
6 Pound, supra note 1.
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